632 621 312 653 estimated that the project of merely replacing the wooden aqueduct would cost between $2,500 and $3,000, and efforts were being made to get the Federal Government to provide the money. Actually the job could have been done by an assessment little larger than that called for by the two main fiestas of the town, but such an idea had not occurred to anyone. This feeling that major improvements should be made by outside agencies is a common one in Mexico.

377 632 653 621 This attitude was somewhat reinforced by the action of the Federal Government in extending a power line to the town and supplying it with street lighting. In this case, it is true, the town was required to provide the posts for the power system. *Comisionados* were named who cut the posts and charred the ends under the direction of the *síndico*. However, this involved expenditure of labor rather than of money.

491 632 621 A number of road repair jobs are undertaken from time to time. In 1940, in preparation for the harvest, the community repaired part of the road toward Nahuatzen. A new entry into town was made which avoided the necessity of crossing a bridge over the southern *barranca*. The existing bridge was in bad repair, and replacement was thus postponed.

ELECTIONS

632 666 662 Elections in Cherán ostensibly follow regular legal forms. Extensive and nearly complete lists of voters are prepared by the municipal officials. Some 2 or 3 weeks before the election the mayor calls a town meeting to nominate candidates. The mayor asserted that everyone was invited in 1940 but that very few attended. Most of those, he insisted, had been rounded up by the police. Others felt that only the most influential people in town were invited. In either case, apparently only about 50 persons attended. As at the 1940 election *barrios* II and IV were to elect members of the *ayuntamiento*, two tickets were nominated. These tickets were forwarded to the State offices of the PRM (*Partido Revolucionario Mexicano*) in Morelia, and the second of the two tickets was approved as the official PRM ticket. This must have been an act of prestidigitation on the part of the State officials, for there was nothing to choose between the two tickets and the State

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632 officials could have had no basis for selection. Actually, the *suplente* in *barrio* II was one of
666 the reactionary members of the community,
662 leader of the ačes. He was chosen solely to stop his constant criticism of the administration.

The election was held on December 1, 1940. In theory, the first Sunday of December is the usual day. A commission, named by the mayor 15 days before, conducted the elections. Two ballot boxes were placed at opposite ends of the *corredor* in front of the *municipio*, one for each *barrio*. Only 45 votes were cast in *barrio* II and only 25 in *barrio* IV. The result of the election was to select the official PRM ticket in *barrio* II and the "opposition" ticket in *barrio* IV.

The procedure resulted in the mayor for the succeeding year, the successful candidate for *barrio* II, being elected by the majority of the 45 votes cast in that *barrio*. The mayor-elect promptly got very drunk and paraded from saloon to saloon for 2 or 3 days, shouting, "*Yo y Avila Camacho*—I and Avila Camacho." (Camacho was about to be installed as President of the Republic.) Murmurs of protest about the new mayor began to be heard on every side, becoming louder and louder. By the end of the month rumors of violence at the installation of the new *ayuntamiento* on January 1 were heard on every side. Loudest to complain were those who had attended neither the nominating *junta* nor the elections.

On January 1 very few people attended the installation of the new officers. The new officials went at the head, the new mayor in the middle, on his right the new *síndico*, and on his left the judge. The mayor carried a *bandera*, a round disk with the national colors in three vertical stripes, while his two companions carried ribbons hanging down from the *bandera*. Behind the new officials came the *reserva*, then a relatively small group of males. At the rear came the band. The procession made a circuit about the plaza and streets of the central part of town. *Cohetes* were fired off as the procession started and at each corner where it changed direction.

On the return to the *municipio*, the new mayor made a speech, received with a scattering of handclaps. The *jefe político*, Moisés Valencia, made another speech, urging cooperation

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632 with the new officials and the betterment of the town. He stressed especially fixing up the ●666 plaza and planting trees. His remarks drew 662 more handclaps than did those of the mayor. This concluded a remarkably tame and peaceful affair.

On the surface, all the rumors had come to nothing and an uninformed visitor might have thought the talk had been nothing else. But the mayor who was inducted at this ceremony was not the elected mayor. In fact, he had not even been a candidate. The same was true of the *suplente* for the *síndico*. Obviously, explanation is called for.

Actually, the matter was simple. The talk and complaints had resulted in action. Apparently no one, on sober thought, wanted the elected mayor. So the *ayuntamiento* picked out someone they thought would be satisfactory and installed him as mayor. The choice seemed actually an excellent one. The new mayor was one of the best-educated men in town, a sober, honest, and conscientious man, fairly prosperous but not rich. None of the investigators found any objection or any tendency to question the action. According to the retiring mayor, one man, an *Almazanista* (that is, a follower of Almazán, the defeated presidential candidate) with little following had raised some objections. But the retiring mayor pointed out that the objector had never bothered to come to the nominating *junta* or to vote, although the mayor had personally invited him to do so and had asked him to make a house-to-house visit to all his followers, urging their attendance. Legality was to be maintained, however, and the State authorities received proper election returns certifying the election of the men installed.

Did this represent corruption and the breakdown of democratic methods as would be the interpretation of legalistic minds deeply steeped in the proprieties of parliamentary procedure? None of the staff of the investigation in Cherán felt it was. The persons finally inducted into office were capable men. They seemed highly acceptable to the bulk of the population, whereas the duly elected candidates were not. Rather, it seems that a truly democratic result had been obtained for a people who are unfamiliar with and distrustful of parliamentary procedures.

632 Persons who are shocked at the procedures
662 at Cherán should seriously contemplate the
666 difficulties in carrying out a formal election
212 with written ballots with a population which is very largely illiterate. In this case economic limitations and lack of imagination prevented carrying out the system used in national elections where the candidates each select a color and separate ballots are printed in the different colors. The voter then asks for his ballot by color and drops it into the ballot box. Not secret, and lending itself to ballot box stuffing, the method is at least an attempt to deal with the problem of an illiterate electorate. In a town such as Cherán the method followed in the election described seems equally efficacious—as long as the officials are responsive to public opinion.

632 That unconventionalities are frequent in elec-
665 tions is further illustrated by the presidential
666 elections earlier in the same year. Many months before the election a group of Almazán followers organized and began an active campaign in the town. The followers of Camacho (the PRM group) remained inactive. At the end of 2 or 3 months a PRM delegation waited on the Almazán followers and pointed out that there had been no interference with their campaign but that nevertheless the bulk of the town favored Camacho. The facts were apparently indisputable, and when the PRM group stressed the fact that further campaigning could only result in creating divisions and dissensions in the town, the Almazán group ceased its campaign. At the election, Cherán cast a unanimous ballot for Camacho.

185 Two things of interest emerge from this
666 account. The first is the power of the argument against disunity in the community. Particularly in the Indian community, unity is prized almost above all else. Sophisticated in some ways as Cherán is, this argument is still one of the most potent that can be made. The second point of interest is the bearing this sequence of events has on interpretation of the national election returns in Mexico. What happened in Cherán probably happened in hundreds of other towns in Mexico and helps partly to explain the one-sided results usually reported in Mexican elections.

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665 In relation to external politics, most Cherán
666 inhabitants have little interest. There are many people who are willing to take a free ride to some big rally for one or another presidential candidate, eat heartily of the free meal, and cheer the candidate's speech enthusiastically. The following week they are quite as ready to accept the hospitality of the opposing candidate, and at election time be too disinterested to vote. Not only is interest lacking, but there is considerable cynicism about the external Government agencies. As one humble farmer remarked, *"Almazán o Camacho, ¿que nos importa? Aqui siempre estamos en la riata*—Almazán or Camacho, what does it matter to us? Here we are always in the noose."

484 Some interest is also awakened by the dis-
666 covery of the Indians as a colorful adjunct to ceremonials. At the inauguration of Camacho as president, some Federal agency (probably the *Departamento Autónomo de Asuntos Indígenas*) took the town officials, the band, and a group of moro dancers to Mexico City. The Cherán citizens lucky enough to get such a trip are always pleased, but it is doubtful whether they are much interested in the reasons.

FISCAL SYSTEM

632 Just as the economy of Cherán in general is
651 partly a money economy, the governmental system is also based partly on money. The presence of hired officials immediately requires some form of cash income for the town. This income is derived from the following sources:

1. Taxes on each beef slaughtered.
2. Taxes of $1.15 on each bill of sale for an animal.
3. Fines.
4. Business licenses. These are collected by the State tax collector, who remits 40 percent of collections to the municipal treasury.
5. Registration of brands. Every cattle [422] brand must be registered and the registry renewed in the first 3 months of each year. This is the biggest source of income for the *municipio*. Three pesos are collected by the *municipio*, which also collects and remits 30 centavos to the State government and 15 centavos to the Federal Government for each brand.
6. Market tax (*piso de plaza*). Every vender in the plaza on Saturdays and at the

coveted because of the higher financial rewards. The nominal pay in both cases is supplemented by bribes and "cuts" from taxes, and by the ego satisfactions of exercising power. Elections take place by public vote every one and three years, respectively, following the informal composition of ballots and considerable discussion at open meetings. High public attendance at these meetings is due both to genuine interest and to fear of persecution if the cacical group should suspect boycotting. Although the duties are formally allotted to specific officers, such as a judge, the officers of both governmental arms actually operate as a group, rather flexibly playing the several roles. In 1956, for example, the civil secretary also functioned at times as judge and mayor.

Both the formal arms of government are controlled by the informal cacicazgo. Today, the preplanned ballot is always finally accepted at the public meetings. Under conditions of centralized autocracy, at least one officer in both the civil and ejidal arms is an inner core leader, and when political troubles are anticipated two offices in each branch may be filled by such nuclear individuals. In the heated election year of 1956, for example, the civil secretary, the ejidal president, and the president of the ejidal watch were nephews of the cacique; the cacique himself was ejidal treasurer, and an old "fighter" and friend of the cacique was judge.

Cacical systems, however, swing between the two extremes of autocratic centralization and contentious fission. When the historical process of contentious fission between the energetic "ex-have-nots" of agrarian politics reaches its extreme, both factions may offer ballots for both branches of government. They will be hotly contended in a variety of ways. The result may be that both factions are represented, as in 1927, or that one faction controls the ejido and another the civil government, as in 1945. Such formal reflexes of a breakdown of informal hegemony are invariably accompanied by a so-called "bad time," with attempts on the lives of the caciques of both factions. Cacical patterns thus rend communities and at other times provide a highly political integration, both in the name of a social and material progress that may actually take shape in the form of schools and public works. The extremes of contentious fission and autocratic centralization do not seem to be correlated with the degree of formal collectivization of the ejido, although such institutional collectivization does make it easier to exercise dictatorial powers and to extract larger financial cuts. On the other hand, the importance of centralized control for continued drainage of the ejido legitimizes the term "hydraulic caciques" (Wittfogel, 1957).

Both formal governments of Durazno are independently related upward to higher, formal structures. Durazno leaders have occupied numerous formal positions at higher levels owing to the salient informal role of the tiny pueblo in the intrigue, violence, and heartfelt radicalism of Michoacan politics. Politics and the cultivation of political leaders have in fact become a sort of communal specialty in Durazno. Durazno caciques founded and held numerous offices in the state-wide peasant League of Agrarian Communities; they have been municipal presidents three times, state congressmen three times, and, once, substitute to a national congressman. They have always formally controlled the important "Regional Committee," the regional organ of the National Peasant Confederation. While highly atypical with respect to this prominence, Durazno does exemplify the role that tough, sophisticated, and land-controlling Indian caciques can play in regional and state politics. As the people say, "Some towns specialize in hat-making, others in pottery. Durazno specializes in politics."

Primarily four political methods have been used by the caciques and their followers for the past forty years. The first, verbal persuasion, takes place in small informal groups and at the frequent political meetings; by comparison with other villages Durazno is a beehive of political discussions. Verbal persuasion figured especially during the